#PIXEL 3XL JUST CAUSE 4 IMAGES VERIFICATION#
This allows for a quick eyeball verification of all the entries in the log for a verifier. However, this value is not cryptographically bound. For Pixel devices, this is a unique human-readable string that describes the build. The first value is the build fingerprint of a corresponding factory image. Log ContentĪs the log payload, each entry in the log conforms to the following format: first_value\nsecond_value\n This log is publicly accessible and thus can be used to verify that the factory image that you possess is included in the Merkle tree. Whenever a new release is available for a Pixel 6 (and beyond) device, we will be adding a manifest for that build as a new entry into the transparency log. If the manifest were added to the log, the public nature of the log would allow the easy discovery of this malicious image.
Binary Transparency enables the detection of such an attack because the manifest of this malicious image was not added to the transparency log by the legitimate owner of the signing key. Transparency systems are designed and deployed to enable detection-and thus deter-supply chain attacks.įor example, let's suppose a malicious image is distributed, and that the attacker has even managed to cause the image to appear to be correctly signed. The corresponding $deviceNameOrSku can be used to find the correct $factoryImage_instance from the website mentioned earlier.
#PIXEL 3XL JUST CAUSE 4 IMAGES DOWNLOAD#
$factoryImage_instance are all factory images, beginning from Pixel 6, available for download from the official website.Claim FactoryImage: (I, Google, claim that $factoryImage_instance is for $deviceNameOrSku), where:.In the case of Binary Transparency, the claim we make is that the factory images downloaded from our official website are official Google/Pixel factory images. The Claimant Model is a framework used to define the roles and artifacts in your verifiable system. Information from this log is publicly accessible, and we publish open-source tools that enable verification by obtaining proofs from the log.īinary Transparency for Pixel 6 enables a user to verify the integrity and provenance of the factory images they download by ensuring that there is an associated entry in the transparency log. Metadata about factory images (in the form of build_fingerprint and VBMeta digest) is logged to this tamper-evident, verifiable log. Every one of these, beginning from Pixel 6, must also appear in the transparency log.
Google updates the factory images for aĪll factory images that are publicly downloadable are listed on the Factory Images for Pixel Devices Google developer website page. Ones published by Google and enable discoverability and authenticity for all The goal is toĮnable device owners to verify that factory images on their phones are the same Since the availability of the Pixel 6 generation of phones. The Pixel verifiable log contains all Pixel factory images published by Google Means of the integrity and provenance of Pixel factory images. Trust but verify, enabling users to better assure themselves by technical You can learn more about Binary Transparency on the Binary Transparency main pageĪnd for specific definitions and context of the technical terms see theĪpplying Binary Transparency to Pixel factory images enables the verify in
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